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Ruth Gavisont
In his recent collection of essays,' Joseph Raz presents and defends a
version of positivism; in his first book-length contribution to legal philoso-
phy,' John Finnis explores a natural law perspective. These two books,
both published by Oxford, may thus serve as a reminder of the persistence
of the debate between legal positivists and those adhering to the natural
law tradition. As this review will show, the books demonstrate that these
apparently contradictory schools of thought both can and must be inte-
grated to enhance our understanding of the complex phenomenon of law.
Rather than rival theories of law, positivism and natural law are, and
should be taken to be, complementary and equally necessary approaches
to a social institution of the utmost importance.
The call to integrate these theories of law is anything but revolutionary.
Sensitive legal scholars, even those who clearly identify themselves as ad-
hering to one school or the other, have always granted that the two per-
spectives are complementary rather than contradictory, and that the ap-
peal of neither is transitory? Raz and Finnis, while presenting approaches
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1. J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979) [hereinafter cited as RAZ].
2. J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) [hereinafter cited as FINNIS].
3. For example, even Jerome Frank explicitly affirms a commitment to a belief in natural law
that is consistent with his positivistic "realistic" approach to the institution of law in society. J.
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xix-xxi (6th printing 1948). And Hans Kelsen, unquestion-
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sufficiently different to justify calling them "positivist" and "natural law-
yer" respectively, together make an important contribution in that direc-
tion. They differ not so much in their understanding of positive law as in
their approach to the study of law and to what context is appropriate for
that study.
The books are not primarily polemical; both Raz and Finnis frequently
acknowledge the value and usefulness of insights traditionally connected
with the other's perspective. Yet at times each sounds as if he wants to
deny what is central to the other's conception of law. I shall argue that
these apparent denials are either misleading or wrong: Finnis must, and
indeed does, accept Raz's version of positivism; and Raz cannot, and does
not want to, deny the centrality of the issues discussed by natural law
theorists but often neglected by positivists.
Part I of this review seeks to outline some of the theses put forward by
Raz and Finnis that give a sense of the way in which the former is a
positivist, the latter a natural law theorist. In Part II these theses are
analyzed to show that the two views are not incompatible. Part III uses
the question of the obligation to obey the law to illustrate four conclu-
sions: that integration is necessary; that Raz and Finnis reach similar sub-
stantive conclusions (couched in differing terminologies) through their dif-
ferent approaches; that general analysis within either perspective is
limited in providing helpful guidelines for conduct in particular cases; and
that neither perspective is generally more conducive to desirable conduct.
I. Raz's Positivism and Finnis' Natural Law
A. Raz
Raz's book is a collection of essays written over the last decade, struc-
tured around the theme of the authority of law: whether the law's claim of
legitimate authority over its subjects is in fact justified." His discussion
ably a leading legal positivist, concluded:
At this moment of our intellectual history, the present essay attempts to explore the founda-
tions of natural-law theory and of positivism. It will have succeeded if it has been able to show
that the contrast between these two elementary tendencies in legal science is rooted in the
ultimate depths of philosophy and personality; and that it involves a never ending conflict.
Kelsen, Natural Law Doctrine and Legal Positivism, in GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 446
(1945). For attempts to study the controversy and to integrate the different perspectives, see, e.g.,
Bodenheimer, Reason and Reality in Jurisprudence, 7 BUFFALO L. REV. 351 (1958); Ehrenzweig,
Psychoanalytical Jurisprudence: A Common Language for Babylon, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1331 (1965);
Jenkins, The Match Maker, or Toward a Synthesis of Legal Idealism and Positivism, 12 J. LEGAL
ED. 1 (1959); Silving, Positive Natural Law, 3 NAT'L L.F. 24 (1958). A. Brecht gives a historical
account of the controversy that provides some hope that the debate can be terminated. A. BRECHT,
POLITICAL THEORY 138-42 (1961).
4. The book, arguing that one of the defining features of law is its claim to legitimate authority,
opens with a philosophical analysis of authority. The following two parts are devoted to essays refut-
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presupposes that in order to answer questions about the authority of law,
we must first understand what authority and law are, and further, that
we can understand what authority and law are without necessarily under-
standing either how and why they come into being or whether they are
justified.
Raz identifies three claims made by positivists and criticized by natural
law theorists: the social, moral, and semantic theses.' The social thesis is
that law may be identified as a social fact, without reference to moral
considerations. The moral thesis is that the moral merit of law is not ab-
solute or inherent but contingent, depending "on the content of the law
and the circumstances of the society to which it applies."' The semantic
thesis is that normative terms such as "right" and "duty," which are com-
mon to moral and legal discourse, are not used in these two contexts with
the same meaning.'
He claims that the social thesis is the most fundamental, and it is the
only one that he endorses. Nevertheless, although Raz shows that the
moral thesis does not follow from his version of positivism, he does argue
that the claim of all laws to legitimate authority is not necessarily justi-
fied, and that individuals do not have a general duty to obey the law.
Raz concedes that the use of the term "law" is too unfocused to justify
adoption of the social thesis, and that the accidents of linguistic usage
should not be conclusive in any case." He further accepts that clean sepa-
ration of description from evaluation of law is a circular benefit of the
social thesis: It begs the question whether such separation is possible or
useful. His argument for the social thesis relies on the three accepted cri-
teria for the identification of legal systems-efficacy, institutional charac-
ter, and sources-to demonstrate that the law is indeed an institution con-
forming to the social thesis.' The institutional character of the law, which
ing "directly, and by implication, a variety of traditional natural law arguments" for the moral au-
thority of law. RAZ at vi. In the process a positivistic picture of law is sketched; the reader interested
in a more detailed and systematic account of law from a positivistic point of view is referred to
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1975) [hereinafter cited as PRACTICAL REASON]. RAZ at vii. Finally,
the last part of the book directly addresses the question of the law's authority, arguing that individuals
have no general moral obligation to obey the law.
Of the fifteen essays in this book, eight have been published before. The new essays include four on
a subject never before discussed by Raz: moral attitudes to law.
This book should be read together with Raz's previous work in legal philosophy. That work in-
cludes CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as CONCEPT], PRACTICAL REA-
SON, supra, and Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972).
5. RAZ at 37. The three theses are in fact three clusters of theses revolving around the questions of
the identification of law, its moral value, and the meaning of its key terms.
6. Id.
7. Compare this analysis of positivism with Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 601-02 n.25 (1958) and S. SHUMAN, LEGAL POSITIVISM 11-30
(1963).
8. RAZ at 41.
9. Id. at 42. This argument appears circular. To support the social thesis, efficacy, institutional
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is accepted by most students of the law, means that laws are identified by
their links to some institutions (either legislatures or adjudicatory organs).
Whatever is not admitted by these institutions, even if it is morally justi-
fied or is a part of social morality, is not law. Whatever they admit and
recognize, even if it clearly is immoral, is law. 10
More controversial is the claim that the law has purely social sources,
that laws can be identified by their emanation from certain
"sources"-from ways that the system recognizes as ways of creating
laws-without recourse to moral argument. Raz claims that this "sources
thesis" (a strong version of the social thesis) is the essence of positivism,"
and that it is vindicated by two considerations. First, it makes sense of
several familiar distinctions: between the legal competence and the moral
sensitivity that we require a judge to possess; between settled and unset-
tled law; and between applying preexisting law and creating new law.
Legal competence is required when the law is settled and need only be
applied; moral sensitivity, creativity, and integrity are required when we
create new law (as we must, according to Raz) to resolve disputes in un-
settled areas of law. 2 Second, and more important, the sources thesis ac-
counts for a basic function of law, one often mentioned by those legal
scholars who seek to justify positive law rather than merely to describe its
defining features: easily identifiable laws "provide publicly ascertainable
standards by which members of the society are held to be bound so that
they cannot excuse non-conformity by challenging the justification of the
standard."' 3 This function helps to secure social cooperation both by its
sanctions and by pointing out the ways in which cooperation can be
achieved.'4 Being identified by social sources is thus not simply accidental:
it is a central feature of law, which serves an important function.
The moral thesis does not follow from the social thesis because the so-
cial facts by which we identify the law may endow it with a moral charac-
character, and sources must be independent indices of the existence and identity of legal systems. Yet
Raz argues that sources are such an index as a different formulation of the social thesis itself. For an
explanation of the nature of the social thesis that may deal with this difficulty (and others), see CON-
CEPT, supra note 4, at 210-16.
10. RAZ at 43-45.
11. Id. at 38, 41, 45-48.
12. Id. at 48-50. For Raz's argument (contra Dworkin) that gaps in the law, and therefore the
need for judicial discretion, are inevitable, see id. at 53-77. For a more detailed discussion (from the
point of view of the English theory of precedent) of the ways in which application and law-making
are intertwined in judging, see id. at 180-209. The distinction between applying preexisting law and
making new law is also discussed in id. at 90-97 (dealing with identity of legal systems). For a less
technical refutation of Dworkin's argument against positivism, see Raz, Legal Principles and the
Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972).
13. RAZ at 52.
14. Id. at 51. Raz points out that this double function of law has often been emphasized by
natural lawyers. Among positivists, he says, Hart was most attentive to it. PRACTICAL REASON, supra
note 4, at 162-70.
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ter."5 And, even if this is not the case, human nature may entail that any
system that is efficacious will in fact have some moral merit." Accepting
the social thesis thus leaves open the question whether the moral merit of
law (either particular laws or law in general) is contingent or inherent.
Raz nonetheless rejects much of the traditional natural law critique of
positivism on this point; he refutes three often-made arguments seeking to
establish the moral authority of law before sketching his own version of
the proper moral attitude to law, which is based on a rejection of a gen-
eral moral obligation to obey it.
The first argument is that positivism's attempt to distinguish in a non-
evaluative manner between law and other forms of social control unduly
neglects the functions of law, and that, since functions cannot be described
in a value-neutral way, all functional accounts of law must involve some
evaluation-a conclusion inconsistent with the social thesis." Raz con-
cedes that the functions of law are central to its description,"s and provides
a schematic classification of these functions. 9 He argues, however, that his
analysis of those functions is in fact non-evaluative, thus refuting by dem-
onstration the claim that all such analyses must be evaluative.2"
The second argument is that it is not true (or possible) that the content
of law is determined exclusively by social fact, since any student of adjudi-
cation knows that judges must resort to notions such as the spirit of the
legislation and the intent of the legislature and that they often explicitly
rely on moral considerations. The critics deduce from this, first, that it is
impossible always to distinguish between what the law is and what it
ought to be (thus rejecting the social thesis) and, second, that since the
process of adjudication is a purposeful human action primarily directed at
promoting the common good, its application by judges guarantees that law
has some moral merit (thus rejecting the moral thesis).2 ' Raz simply con-
cedes that judges do in fact invoke these notions and sometimes rely on
(extralegal) moral considerations. He argues that this is inevitable in all
source-based systems, that judges are indeed required to "go beyond the
15. Id. at 38-39.
16. Id. Hart has elaborated this thesis, arguing that some minimal features of human nature
suggest that all legal systems must have a "minimal content of natural law." H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 189-95 (1961).
17. See Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 3 NAT'L L.F. 68 (1959); Nagel, On the Fu-
sion of Fact and Value: A Reply to Professor Fuller, 3 NAT'L L.F. 77 (1959); Fuller, A Rejoinder
with Professor Nagel, 3 NAT'L L.F. 83 (1959); Nagel, Fact, Value and Human Purpose, 4 NAT'L
L.F. 26 (1960) [entire series of articles hereinafter cited as the Fuller-Nagel exchange].
18. RAZ at 163-65.
19. Id. at 176.
20. Id. at vii. For another refutation of this argument, see infra pp. 1266-67.
21. See Fuller's articles in the Fuller-Nagel exchange, supra note 17; Fuller, Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply To
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661-69 (1958).
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law," sketching the constraints on these judicial activities.2 2 His argument
is, presumably, that there is nothing in the nature of this activity that
guarantees moral merit to the law or to judicial decisions.
23
The last of these arguments is that one of the distinguishing marks of
law is its "obedience" to the ideal of the rule of law.24 This in itself is held
to confer moral merit on the law, making it preferable to systems of arbi-
trary and capricious discretion. Explicitly addressing this argument, 2 Raz
analyzes the ideal of the rule of law and its value, stressing the important
moral goals served by conformity to this ideal.2' He nevertheless rejects
the claim that by conforming to this ideal, law necessarily acquires moral
merit. The rule of law, he maintains, is indeed necessary for the law to
perform its function as an effective guide for behavior. But this efficiency
is not itself morally valuable; its merit depends on the substantive goals
that the law in fact seeks to promote. Faithfulness to the rule of law
minimizes abuse of the power conferred by the law, but it does not confer
additional and independent moral merit on the law; the rule of law is a
negative virtue, since the risk of arbitrary power is created by the law
itself.
28
Finally, Raz accepts the traditional natural law rejection of the seman-
tic thesis. To understand that position we must introduce Raz's distinction
between types of statements .2  Statements such as "X has authority,"
"there is a valid rule that one should not kill another person," or "there is
an obligation to keep promises" may all be used in at least three different
22. See supra note 12.
23. He argues explicitly that it is possible to distinguish between the elements of law and those of
value in adjudication. Raz at 180-209. This would preserve the sources thesis, but may still support
the judgment that we introduce a guarantee of some moral value through the deliberate application of
law by judges. But this part of Fuller's argument was critically discussed and rejected by both Hart,
supra note 7; Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1965) (reviewing L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW (1967)), and Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law-Observations Prompted by Profes-
sor Fuller's Novel Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 668 (1965); see also infra pp. 1267-68.
24. The rule of law is defined as a system of general laws that are prospective, open, clear,
relatively stable, governing the making of particular laws, with adjudicatory institutions that (1) are
guaranteed to be independent, (2) follow the rules of natural justice, (3) have the power to review
activities of other organs, and (4) are easily accessible. See RAZ at 214-19 (eighth principle here
subsumed under third); see also FINNIS at 270-71; L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev.
ed. 1969).
25. See RAZ at 223-25 (identifying Fuller as target).
26. Raz mentions three such goals: curbing arbitrary exercise of power, protecting freedom by
securing some predictability of consequences, and protecting human autonomy and dignity by provid-
ing some certainty and stability in human affairs. Id. at 219-23.
27. He uses the analogy of a knife: some ability to cut is a virtue, but one neutral to the end to
which the instrument is put. Id. at 225-26.
28. Id. at 224.
29. Raz introduces this distinction in PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 4, at 171-77, and uses it
here in the essay Legal Validity, RAZ at 146-59. He also uses it, without explicitly introducing it, in
his discussion of authority. Id. at 3-27. Finnis is, however, the source of my notation. See FINNIS at
234-37.
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senses. The first sense (S1) is the full-force normative statement about the
existence and strength of reasons for action: X indeed has legitimate au-
thority" to do what he does; there are indeed good reasons for not killing
another person; people should indeed keep their promises. The second
(S,) is an empirical statement about beliefs, intentions, and conduct: peo-
ple believe that X has authority (S1), X in fact has the power to make
others obey him; individuals believe they should not kill others or break
promises and they usually do not do so.3" And the third (S3) is a statement
made "from a point of view,"'32 saying that there is a point of view from
(or a normative system under) which X has authority. The maker of such
a statement does not necessarily endorse33 this authority; he may still want
to say that X does not in fact have legitimate authority. Yet S3 is not an
empirical statement like S2: it is a detached normative statement about the
existence of legitimate authority within a given system, made without en-
dorsing that system.
4
This tripartite distinction enables Raz to reject the semantic thesis.3" He
in fact characterizes law as a system that claims legitimate, S1 authority:36
the law claims that the duties it imposes are moral duties, that people
ought to obey the law. It is clear that many people both endorse such
claims for efficacious legal systems and are willing to make fully commit-
ted statements about the law and the duties it imposes.37 But whether
authority is legitimate is a moral question; thus, endorsement by many
people is not sufficient. Raz himself, holding that moral considerations do
30. For Raz's excellent analysis of authority, see RAZ at 16-25; see also infra note 73.
31. S2 statements are empirical statements about the beliefs, intentions, purposes, and perceptions
of individuals. When they relate to the existence and legitimacy of norms, they must be distinguished
from (both S, and S) normative statements: A particular belief statement is only one instance of a
range of possible S statements. Although some S2 statements logically presuppose Si statements, their
truth does not depend on the normative force or on the justification of the latter. A person may believe
X has authority even though X's claim of authority is not in fact justified.
32. RAZ at 153-57. See also PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 4, at 176-77.
33. Raz distinguishes two senses of "endorsement": as meaning that all should obey the rule
(strong endorsement), and as being limited to the speaker himself (weak endorsement). RAZ at 155
n.13.
34. Such statements may, in Kelsen's example, be made by an anarchist lawyer asked to describe
the state of the law. His answer would describe the normative situation within the legal system with-
out endorsing the system as a whole. RAZ at 156.
35. See infra p. 1257. Raz also notes that a semantic thesis that is usually advanced by adherents
of natural law theories-that all legal statements are moral statements-is shown only to be modified,
not to be rejected outright. Since legal (S.) statements are normally true for a society in which many
believe that they are also moral (S) statements, it is true to some extent that we can deduce S2
statements from the existence of S3 statements. Thus, legal statements are moral statements in the S,
sense. See RAZ at 158-59. (This is a somewhat speculative account of Raz's position. His own account
may say that we can deduce S, statements from the existence of S. statements, but such a reading
seems inconsistent with his distinction between beliefs about norms and their justification.)
36. RAZ at 28-33.
37. See id. at 159 (arguing that statements from legal point of view only likely to be made and
only of interest in societies in which many people are willing to make corresponding full-blooded S,
statements).
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not support a general moral obligation to obey the law, denies that the
law always has legitimate authority."' In this sense the moral thesis is
correct: the fact that something is a legal obligation does not in itself pro-
vide a moral reason for doing what the law requires. 9
Most lawyers, says Raz, justifiably concentrate on S3 norms, which are
identified by their links to legal institutions." He suggests that (despite
the "derivative" nature of S3 statements 1) making law in this systemic
and institutionalized sense the subject of special study may be desirable,
since it is an important social institution." He thus accepts the separate
study of law and the convenience of the distinction between legal philoso-
phy and other branches of philosophy, such as political philosophy or
practical reason in general.43 He proposes a rather minimal identifying
definition of law, 4 which he then uses to classify statements as legal or
nonlegal"t and philosophy as legal or political, stressing that the complex
interrelations between law and other institutions and social forces should
not be neglected.
All this does not follow ineluctably from his version of positivism; but it
is clearly consistent with that positivism and fits in nicely with the central-
ity he accords to the sources thesis as a necessary part of any adequate
38. For a more detailed analysis of Raz's view on this issue, see infra pp. 1271-73.
39. This does not mean the semantic thesis, see supra p. 1252, can remain unmodified. Legal
statements may be made without endorsing the moral force of the law, supra note 34: a person can
recognize a legal duty (S.) to serve in the army in any war being fought by his country, yet challenge
the law by arguing that no such duty (S,) should exist. Such a position is not self-contradictory
because the criteria for identifying what the law is (e.g., decision by the highest court of the jurisdic-
tion) and for evaluating the moral merit of the law are different. RAZ at 158 (dubbing this the view of
cautious positivist addressing moral thesis). But the term "duty" is not used here in two different
senses; the primary meaning is the full normative (S,) meaning, implying both that there are good
reasons for imposing the duty and, accordingly, that people should do what that duty requires. This is
true even though "duty" may at times be used in a parasitic S, statement, which may be detached and
uncommitted and does not necessarily endorse the moral force of the norm imposing the duty.
40. RAZ at 44.
41. Id. at 159. See supra note 39.
42. Stressing that the complex interrelations between law and other social institutions and forces
should not be neglected, he nonetheless adds that "there is also sufficient reason to encourage the
general public's consciousness of law as a special kind of institution." RAZ at 44.
43. Raz identifies the special contribution of legal philosophy to the resolution of practical ques-
tions as concern "with the way in which the fact that a certain action has some legal consequences
should affect practical deliberation generally and moral considerations in particular." Id. at vi. He
describes his own essays as belonging to political philosophy and to analytical legal philosophy. Id. at
ix.
44. "[P]ut in a nutshell, it is a system of guidance and adjudication claiming supreme authority
within a certain society and therefore, where efficacious, also enjoying such effective authority." Id. at
43. He explains that other features of law properly belong to the sociology of law. Id. at 44. Oddly,
this definition does not include the existence of adjudicative institutions "charged with regulating dis-
putes arising out of the application of the norms of the system," which he had called a defining
feature of law on the same page, see id. at 43. Raz later adds other features. See id. at 103-21; see also
PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 4, at 149-54.
45. Raz is sensitive to the impossibility of always applying this distinction in an all-or-nothing
fashion. See infra note 86.
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description of law. "Law" for him is primarily positive, S, law: the sys-
tem of social guidance and control with which we are all familiar, whose
working can be analyzed by looking at social reality and at the patterns of
reasoning that people use within the system itself-the institution that is
of great importance in structuring social life and in guaranteeing some
values. Legal philosophy is the enterprise of analyzing and understanding
this institution.
B. Finnis
Finnis comes to his subject from a very different perspective. His book
is not about what he calls "human Law" in isolation: his purpose is to
identify the benefits that can be secured only through human (or positive)
law and the practical requirements that only its institutions can satisfy,
and thus to show when such institutions are justified and how they can be
defective." "Natural law," according to him, provides the criteria for eval-
uating those institutions: it is "the set of principles of practical reasonable-
ness in ordering human life and human community."47 In more conven-
tional terminology, natural law is a combination of ethics with political
philosophy.
Consequently, Finnis starts by identifying basic forms of human good
(life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasona-
bleness, religion) and basic requirements of practical reasonableness. 4' He
next considers life in human communities and the notions of justice and
rights. Only then does he discuss the need for authority, and law as a
means of satisfying that need. Finally, he discusses the idea of obligation,
both moral and legal, and the problem of unjust laws. He concludes by
putting all this discussion within the broader perspective of "Nature, rea-
son and god.
'49
Thus, Finnis' starting point, as he himself makes clear, is not actual
human institutions. His characterization of law is a result of his analysis
46. FINNIS at 3.
47. Id. at 280.
48. He formulates this set of fundamental goods on the basis of the forms of human flourishing
that he identifies with the aid of criteria distinguishing between sound and unsound practical thinking.
This distinction in turn aids in distinguishing between morally right and morally wrong ways of
acting. Id. at 23.
49. Id. at 371-413.
50.
[R]ules made, in accordance with regulative legal rules, by a determinate and effective author-
ity (itself identified and, standardly, constituted as an institution by legal rules) for a 'complete'
community, and buttressed by sanctions in accordance with the rule-guided stipulations of
adjudicative institutions, this ensemble of rules and institutions being directed to reasonably
resolving any of the community's co-ordination problems (and to ratifying, tolerating, regulat-
ing or overriding co-ordination solutions from any other institutions or sources of norms) for
the common good of that community, according to a manner and form itself adapted to that
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of the need for authority"' and the kinds of constraints to which this au-
thority should be subjected to. Law is presented as the authority required,
and it is clear that ideally it is an authority in the S1 sense. 2 His concep-
tion of law is not, therefore, an attempt to describe social reality; rather, it
is constructed from the requirements of practical reasonableness.53 To the
extent that social reality exhibits systems that are "more legal" in Finnis'
sense, it satisfies those requirements to a greater degree.5 4 To the extent
that it does not, or to the extent that the systems fail to meet those re-
quirements in some respects, the evaluation of human reality in terms of
this conception of law identifies where social systems (which are in this
sense "less" legal) go wrong.5
Finnis characterizes legal systems as those governing "a complete com-
munity, purporting to have authority to provide comprehensive and su-
preme direction for human behaviour in that community, and to grant
legal validity to all other normative arrangements affecting the members
of that community."- 6 The distinguishing mark of law is that it operates
by an attitude of obedience to a set of general and abstract rules and prin-
ciples, which are to be applied to specific cases, rather than by obedience
to particular people; those in authority under the law are regarded as
officials, whose powers are defined by the law. Consequently, law brings
"definition, specificity, clarity and thus predictability into human interac-
common good by features of specificity, minimization of arbitrariness, and maintenance of a
quality of reciprocity between the subjects of the law both amongst themselves and in their
relations with the lawful authorities.
Id. at 276-77.
51. We need authority, argues Finnis, because life in complex communities requires much coordi-
nation both to solve existing problems and to promote the common good. This is true even in the
absence of any tendency to exploit and to "free ride," since the community would still need to solve
coordination problems, and the number of such problems would increase as members used their inge-
nuity in promoting the common good. Id. at 231-33. For most coordination problems there is a range
of acceptable solutions; but none of these solutions will in fact work unless it is adopted to the exclu-
sion of all others. This choice of solution must be made, to be binding, either by unanimity or by
authority (promises are not a third way of making decisions, but simply a modality of unanimity, id.
at 232). Since unanimity is not likely to be achieved, authority is the only practical solution. More-
over, there are good reasons for wanting the question of the locus of authority itself to be determined
by authority rather than by unanimity, id. at 245-52, the achievement of which is "very taxing and
exhausting for all concerned," id. at 249. For this reason Finnis finds the idea that the whole popula-
tion is the "real" source of authority misleading: authority cannot be exercised by such a large group
of individuals, which is precisely why we need authority to begin with. Id. at 16, 247-49.
52. For Finnis, as for Raz, the primary sense of "X has authority" is the S. sense. Id. at 233-37.
For the nature of legal authority, see id. at 352-54, 359-69.
53. See id. at 277; infra p. 1260.
54. Finnis argues that most of the factors he mentions can be instantiated to a degree. He insists
that a social phenomenon that does not exhibit all these factors (or that exhibits them to a less-than-
full extent) is not to be excluded from the realm of the "legal"; repeatedly, he expressly recommends
that we call social phenomena more or less legal, rather than simply law or not-law. He perceives his
definition to be of the focal sense of law. Id. at 277-81.
55. Id. at 16. One of Finnis' primary aims, it should be recalled, is to identify the ways in which
actual systems are deficient. See supra p. 1258.
56. FINNIS at 260; see also supra note 50 (citing definition).
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tions."57 The point of this predictability is to allow people the dignity of
coherently planning their own lives, a goal which is achieved to a larger
degree the more the law conforms to the requirements of the rule of law."
Finnis dearly states that adherence to natural law theories does not
suggest that the content of specific positive laws may be derived from nat-
ural law. The principles of practical reasonableness are permanently and
universally relevant; but particular laws of particular societies may
change. It is a fundamental concern of any "sound 'natural law theory' of
law" 9 to study and understand the relationships between the two. In a
suggestive discussion Finnis introduces the distinction between those parts
of positive law that incorporate, with some differences of style and speci-
ficity, principles of natural law (for example, the prohibition of murder)
and those parts that are merely "determinations," also governed by some
principles of practical reasonableness, but not directly deducible from any
substantive natural law principle.6 0
Like Raz, he clearly rejects the semantic thesis. His discussion of obli-
gation, for example, is meant to be equally applicable to moral and to
legal obligations, although he concedes that the two types of obligation
differ in some respects. Obligations in general are imposed by the require-
ments of practical reasonableness: 61 they cannot fully be explained by ref-
erence either to (external) sanctions or to the (internal) fear of those sanc-
tions.62 Any adequate explanation of legal (intra-systemic) obligation
would have to account by practical reason for both its existence and for its
57. Id. at 268. It achieves this benefit by recognizing as valid norms that were created in an
accepted way, by allowing individuals to exercise power according to rules, and in general by enabling
the past to govern the future actions of individuals. The fiction that all practical problems have al-
ready been solved within this system, that there are no gaps in the law, reinforces the predictability of
legal outcomes. For, although this belief is misleading as a description and may have undesirable
consequences in limiting the development of law by non-legislative organs, it is significant in strength-
ening the belief that law, as a system that obeys the "rule of law, not rule of men," is capable of
bringing certainty and predictability into human affairs. Id. at 269. (It is interesting and typical that
Finnis discusses the need for authority, see id. at 231-33, before he deals with the meaning of author-
ity. On the latter question, he accepts Raz's characterization. Id. at 233-34.)
58. Id. at 270-73.
59. Id. at 281.
60. Id. at 281-90.
61. Finnis accepts Raz's distinction between types of normative statements. He can thus argue
that it is not contradictory to say that "X is under an obligation to Q, but he should not Q," since the
first clause can be understood as an S, (empirical) or an S, (intra-systemic) statement. Id. at 234-237;
see supra pp. 1255-57.
62. Finnis congratulates Hart for his distinction between being obliged and being under an obli-
gation, but argues that Harts own account was deficient on similar grounds, that it too cannot fully
explain the normative power of obligations. FINNIS at 313-14. For a similar criticism of Hart, see
Bechler, The Concept of Law and the Obligation to Obey, 23 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 120 (1978).
Finnis argues that a full explanation of a normative obligation cannot be reduced to the likelihood of
incurring sanctions for nonconformity, or even to the fact that individuals obey because they are aware
of such a likelihood and want to avoid it. FINNIS at 313-14.
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invariant normative force. 3 An explanation would, then, need to refer"' to
the way legal obligations actually operate in the practical reasoning of a
reasonable person, both motivating him to obey and providing that obedi-
ence with significance and coherence.
To describe the operation of legal obligation, Finnis employs the fol-
lowing scheme:
A. Promoting the common good and participating in the coordina-
tion necessary for it require an individual to be lawabiding, and
hence impose an obligation to be lawabiding.
B. Where the law imposes a duty to Q, the only way to be
lawabiding is to Q.
C. We have an obligation to obey the law."
Step A is a part of the general flow of practical reasoning; hence, the force
of the obligation it imposes may vary from situation to situation (it is of
variable obligatory force). This moral obligation is nevertheless very
weighty, since the law can succeed in attaining its goals of coordination
and promotion of the common good only if "individuals drastically restrict
the occasions on which they trade off their legal obligations against their
individual convenience or conceptions of social good."66
From within the legal system, however, step A is an unquestioned ax-
iom, isolated from this general flow. The combination of step A (thus
seen) with step B yields the invariant obligatory force of S, strictly legal,
obligation: the law forbids the citizen (and the judge, who swears to work
within the law) to recover the moral (variable) force of step A.67 In the
appropriate circumstances, the citizen may disregard the command of the
law and return step A to the general flow of moral reasoning, thus arriv-
ing at a variable moral obligation to obey the law.6 ' This is an obligation
of the S1 type. Such obligations are defeasible: abuses of authority in their
creation or injustice in their application can defeat the moral obligation to
obey.6 Thus, he presents legal obligations as moral, S., as well as strictly
63. Moral obligations are of variable obligatory force in that they can be defeated by a large
variety of countervailing reasons. FINNIS at 308-09 (discussing example of obligation to keep promises,
which is "very variable, and often quite weak," id. at 308). Legal obligations, on the other hand, are,
like legal validity, of invariant force: they are all equally obligatory, and they are fully regulated by
legal norms. A person can plead all reasonable excuses when he does not perform a moral duty; but
only those excuses recognized by the law may be pleaded in court. Id. at 309-14.
64. Id. at 312, 314. For the type of explanation required, see supra p. 1260.
65. FINNIS at 314-16.
66. Id. at 319.
67. The law, says Finnis, tries to isolate "legal thought" from the rest of practical reasoning, to
give it the status of dogma. Within the legal system, the moral force of legal obligations is rarely
discussed. Id. at 317-18; see also infra pp. 1276-78 (discussing unjust laws).
68. FINNIS at 318.
69. Id. at 318-20, 351-66. See also infra pp. 1276-78 (discussing unjust laws).
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legal, S., obligations.
Finnis' natural law perspective reveals itself in more than his focus on
evaluating social phenomena and his concern with universal and invariant
principles of practical reasonableness,7 0 even in more than his assertion
that the values he lists as forms of human flourishing are self-evident.7
Ultimately, his strongest tie to this tradition is his belief that the meaning
of human existence and of all obligations to participate in the common
good must be discussed in terms transcending the limited experience of
actual individuals or groups.72 Because he does not argue that the exis-
tence of God can be demonstrated, this insistence on transcendence does
not entail thinking of natural law as God's will. But he does show that
scholars and thinkers have always needed to postulate an "uncaused
cause" when speculating about nature and reason.7 From this he argues
that accepting God as this uncaused cause may provide an additional,
deeper, basis for explaining obligation, as well as an explanation of the
objective meaning of human experience and existence.74
On a less fundamental level, Finnis' commitment to natural law leads
him to emphasize the misleading effects of studying
human-positive-law in isolation from natural law. He holds that such
studies would falsify the meaning and significance of law, politics, and
ethics, each of which is merely one aspect of the attempt to structure
human life in accordance with the requirements of practical reasonable-
ness (itself a basic human good). He recognizes the practical advantages
of artificially and arbitrarily isolating the intra-systemic professional per-
spective,76 but warns against overstating this separability of law from the
general flow of moral reasoning. At certain points Finnis appears to en-
dorse even the much stronger view that law cannot be studied from a
perspective other than his77-a view incompatible with Raz's positivism.
70. Finnis himself acknowledges that these principles are only "law" by analogy. He says that
others have used the term "law" as a label for such principles; but they "could, without loss of
meaning, have spoken instead of 'natural right', 'intrinsic morality', natural reason, or right reason, in
action, etc. But no synonyms are available for law in our focal sense." FINNIS at 280-81.
71. As an illustration, Finnis develops support for the idea that knowledge (a basic good) is self-
evidently and obviously good. Id. at 59-80.
72. Id. at 371-78.
73. Id. at 378-88. Finnis argues that this postulation is necessary to explain why a unique, rather
than some other possible, state of affairs exists.
74. Id. at 388-414. Finnis is careful not to argue that his analysis proves the existence of God. He
does say, however, that rational speculation that stops short of recognizing God as the "uncaused
cause" is "less secure" than speculation based on faith and revelation. Id. at 403-10.
75. "The principles of practical reasonableness and their requirements form one unit of inquiry
which can be subdivided into 'moral', 'political', and 'jurisprudential' only for a pedagogical or exposi-
tory convenience which risks falsifying the understanding of all three." Id. at 359.
76. See, e.g., id. at 279-80, 319. Finnis is, of course, aware of the necessity that lawyers work
within the system. See supra TAN 65-69; infra TAN 103-06.
77. See infra TAN 91-112.
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The next section will show that this appearance is illusory.
II. The Compatibility of the Perspectives
Before dealing with the apparent conflicts between these scholars, it
should be mentioned that the two analyses are similar in ways not obvious
from the foregoing exposition. Since Raz's work precedes Finnis', at first
glance the similarity seems to result from Raz's evident influence on Fin-
nis. For example, Finnis accepts Raz's analysis of authority and his dis-
tinction between types of normative statements;"8 his discussion of the rule
of law is very similar to Raz's;" and the identifying marks of positive law
in Finnis' scheme are very similar to those listed by Raz. 0 The similarity,
however, has deeper sources than the explanation of influence would sug-
gest."1 The two books share a commitment to the value and importance of
general jurisprudence. Furthermore, they share a basic concern with the
authority of law and with the circumstances in which that authority is
justified: 2 both raise the question of whether acceptance of any authority
is consistent with autonomy,83 and both, for similar reasons, answer that
question affirmatively.8"
There are nevertheless three main areas of apparent tension between
their positions: the way we form and assess our conceptions of law; the
utility of defining the limits of jurisprudence and of permitting reliance on
78. See supra note 61.
79. For Raz's analysis, see supra p. 1255; for Finnis', see FINNIS at 270-76; supra pp. 1259-60.
Finnis criticizes Raz's knife analogy, FINNIS at 274, but notes that "in other respects the article is a
valuable study of the content and point of the Rule of Law," id. at 293 n.X.5.
80. Both stress law's claim of authority, its supremacy, its comprehensiveness, its regulation of its
own making and application, and its function of legitimating private arrangements. See supra notes
44, 50.
81. The two writers apparently encountered at least parts of each other's work before publication,
see RAZ at 37 n.*; FINNIS at vii. They were educated in the same tradition of analytical legal philoso-
phy, see FINNIS at vi, and are familiar with the basic works of that school. For a review of that school,
see Twining, Academic Law and Legal Philosophy: The Significance of Herbert Hart, 95 L.Q. REV.
557 (1980). Finnis clearly brings to his work a wide knowledge of natural law literature as well.
82. Raz states that the main question that his book attempts to answer is what authority we
should acknowledge to be due to the law. RAZ at v. For Finnis' general purpose, see FINNIS at 3;
supra p. 1258.
83. FINNIS at 231. Raz's discussion of legitimate authority is structured around this theme. See
infra note 84.
84. Finnis says that individuals may recapture the variable force of the obligation to obey the law
by putting it back into the general flow of practical reasoning. See supra pp. 1260-61. Raz disputes
R.P. Wolff's conclusion, see R. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970), that authority and au-
tonomy are never compatible. Raz agrees with Wolff that individuals are never justified in aban-
doning autonomy (the right and duty to act on one's own judgment as to what ought to be done, all
things considered). He further agrees that accepting authority is accepting a reason not to act on the
balance of first-order reasons; thus, authoritative commands become a type of second-order reason that
Raz calls an exclusionary reason. The reconciliation of autonomy with authority is based on the
possibility of deciding autonomously and justifiably that one should not act on the first-order balance
of reasons but should accept some exclusionary reasons for action. RAZ at 25-27. For a detailed ac-
count of Raz's notion of exclusionary reasons, see PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 4, at 35-48.
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this demarcation; and the question of our moral obligation to obey the
law. I shall deal with the last issue in part III. Here, I shall argue that as
to the first two issues the appearance of incompatibility is misleading. I
shall demonstrate, first, that some of the theses that Finnis may be read as
adopting"5 are wrong, and that the only acceptable interpretation of Fin-
nis' position on concept formation is compatible with Raz's social thesis.
Second, I shall show that Raz and Finnis themselves develop their views
on the limits of jurisprudence in terms of utility for some purposes, and
that those views may be reconciled.
A. Conceptions of Law
The conceptions of law used by Raz and Finnis are very different in
status. Raz's conception is an attempt to provide an adequate description
of law. If his conception does not cover something that is frequently re-
garded as an instance of law, he will have either to argue that the phe-
nomenon is not in fact law, and that his account has the merit of pointing
this out, or to modify his account." His ultimate justification for the social
thesis itself is grounded on his perception that the law, when seen as an
institution, behaves according to that thesis; 7 that is, on contingent, ob-
servable facts. His conception of law is descriptive or analytical.
Finnis' conception, on the other hand, does not purport to describe so-
cial reality. Instead, he constructs a regime that it would be desirable to
have in human communities. If valid, it will hold good as long as human
nature remains what it is, even if all social orders lack many of the ele-
ments that make a system legal in his account. The resulting conception
may be used in studying actual societies to identify where those societies
succeed, and where they fall, in meeting the desired criteria; it is an evalu-
ative conception.
Raz says little about evaluative conceptions of law; but he probably
would not deny that for some purposes they are useful and valuable. He
would merely insist that any complete theory of law must include some
criterion for identifying law"8 and that this criterion must be social, not
85. Finnis' position is unclear. See infra pp. 1265-67.
86. This does not mean that his conception can always clearly classify a standard or a system as
legal or not legal. Raz observes that, since his characterization of the uniqueness of law is mul-
tifaceted, and since some of the elements are matters of degree rather than all-or-nothing features, it is
sometimes only possible or useful to point out similarities and dissimilarities and to leave it at that.
RAZ at 116. In this sense Raz's conception of law is similar to Finnis': both have a number of traits
that can be instantiated to a greater or a lesser extent, and thus neither can always be used for a yes-
or-no identification of law. What is peculiar to Raz's account is his insistence that theories of law
must also contain some criterion for identifying law within the legal system.
87. RAZ at 42.
88. He realizes that not all legal philosophers were moved to concede the importance of such a
criterion in a legal theory. He argues, nonetheless, that the question of identification clearly is an
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moral. He would insist, further, that for some purposes the identificatory
function of the "rule of recognition" is a central feature of legal systems,
and that a conception of law built around this insight would be useful and
legitimate in some contexts.89 All this is quite consistent, according to him,
with the view that the law is also moral."
Finnis' statements about concept formation are open to several interpre-
tations, which I characterize as "strong" and "weak" theses. His position
is that all conceptions of law (and all conceptions in social science) must
be evaluative, whether designed to be used in evaluation or in description
and analysis. 1 The different theses grow out of three possible senses of
"evaluative."
That term may mean that, if all conceptions of law are evaluative,
something which is "more legal" under such a conception is also more
morally desirable: the strong thesis. Finnis'-but not Raz's-conception of
law is evaluative in that sense.
But "evaluative" may be read in two other ways. It may mean, first,
that the application of an evaluative conception requires making judg-
ments about features of social reality, or that in forming the conception we
make judgments about the importance or significance of certain features
and the insignificance of others. Second, it may refer to the practice of
taking account, in describing social and human activities, not only of ex-
ternal conduct but of the way actors think of their actions, purposes, and
motives, and of their perceptions of the meaning of what they are doing:
the rejection of behaviorism. Nonbehavioristic accounts do refer to the way
an agent perceives his actions, which is evaluation of a sort; but such eval-
uations are not necessarily moral.
Many believe that all social concepts, including the concept of law,
must indeed be evaluative in these two senses: the weak thesis. Both
Raz's92 and Finnis'" conceptions of law are evaluative in the weak sense;
important jurisprudential question, so that theories not addressing it are incomplete theories of law.
Id. at 40.
89. Id. at 44. See also PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 4.
90. RAz at 158.
91. Finnis starts by denying that it is possible to separate description and evaluation; but he then
proceeds to the more cautious statement that "a theorist cannot give a theoretical description and
analysis of social facts, unless he also participates in the work of evaluation, of understanding what is
really good for human persons, and what is really required by practical reasonableness." FINNIS at 3.
92. Raz both explicitly and implicitly (by his choice of approach) rejects behavioristic accounts of
law. RAZ at 40, 50. And his search is for significant aspects of social reality, as is indicated by his
refusal to rely exclusively on usage. The question for him is whether the suggested conception "helps
identify facts of importance to our understanding of society." Id. at 41.
93. Finnis mentions both the need to take into account the perceptions of actors, FINNIS at 3-4,
and the fact that the search for a conception is one for "what is important and significant in the field
of data and experience" with which all scholars are "equally and thoroughly familiar," id. at 9 (em-
phasis in original).
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in Max Weber's terminology, both conceptions are "ideal types."94
It is possible that Finnis would accept the strong thesis." Let me say,
then, why the strong thesis must fail before I point out that Finnis himself
accepts positions that suggest that he meant only to advance the weak
thesis.
The strong thesis may involve one or more of the following claims:
1. All concepts used in the analysis and description of social reality
must be evaluative in the strong sense.
This claim may be refuted by a number of counterexamples. We
use non-evaluative concepts such as "stratification," "division of la-
bor," and "means of production" in our social analysis. Nothing
moral follows immediately and inevitably from a description of one
society as being more stratified than another, or as having more, or
more diversified, means of production. Finnis is obviously right
when he says that such concepts do not come to us ready-made as a
part of social reality; 6 we do form and choose them, and in the
process we make judgments about the significance of certain facts
and of certain connections between facts. Yet these judgments have
nothing to do, in these cases, with any inherent moral value or de-
pravity of the phenomena.1
7
2. Descriptions of human activities (or artifacts) that have functions
cannot be non-evaluative.
It is true that a description of a thing that is defined by its func-
94. Ideal types are theoretical constructs designed to highlight and emphasize features of social
reality. See Weber, Objectivity in the Social Sciences, in MAX WEBER ON THE METHODOLOGY OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 49-112 (E. Shils & H. Finch eds. 1949); see also infra note 108. Weber insists
that the construction of ideal types is based on judgments of significance, and that the perceptions of
agents are an important ingredient of such judgments.
95. He congratulates Raz (and Hart) for realizing that a conception of law must be formed from
a practical point of view (a position that rejects behavioristic accounts), then argues that the most
appropriate practical point of view is that of people who have a distinct interest in the use of law in
preference to other ways of structuring society, that is, the point of view of people who accept the
moral superiority of law. Among these, he continues, we should choose those whose judgments about
practical reason are indeed reasonable. FINNIS at.6-18. He thus advocates forming the conception of
law from the point of view of the moral man whose moral reasoning is sound. Following this proce-
dure will result almost inevitably in Finnis' own conception of law, which he constructed in that way;
in any event, it must yield a conception of law that is evaluative in the strong sense. Finnis criticizes
Raz and Hart for choosing the wrong point of view in forming their own conceptions of law. Id. at
12-15. The implication is that Hart and Raz are wrong, not merely that their choice of point of view
has limited applicability. My reading of Finnis as not adopting those theses is strengthened by his
own use of conceptions of law that would be unacceptable under the strong thesis. See infra pp. 1269-
70.
96. "The subject matter of the theorist's description does not come neatly demarcated from other
features of social life and practice." Id. at 4.
97. This is true even though we may be interested in the phenomena only because we expect them
to be related (directly or indirectly) to other things we value, or to provide a conceptual framework
within which to investigate those things.
98. See supra p. 1254.
1266
Natural Law
tion must affirm that it has some minimal capacity to perform the
function; but such functional affirmations are morally evaluative
only if the function itself has a determinate moral value. Nothing
will be called a knife if it could not cut; yet knives are not inher-
ently morally good or bad."
Raz and other positivists have long conceded that the law can
indeed be defined by its functions; Raz's essay on the classification
of functions was included in this book precisely to show that a
value-neutral description of the functions of law was possible, that
the functional nature of law does not necessarily bestow on it moral
value.' ° Calling something law does entail the (evaluative) claim
that it has at least minimal effectiveness in carrying out legal func-
tions (say, dispute resolution), but says nothing about its moral
value (unless we assume that some moral value inheres in resolving
disputes through the legal system).
3. All adequate descriptions of deliberate and purposeful human ac-
tion must be evaluative.10
The case for this thesis is stronger, because we feel that-unlike
impersonal functions-all purposeful human actions have some
moral significance. Nonetheless, it is not persuasive. In the context
of this debate it would mean that, since the making and application
of laws are purposeful human activities, they necessarily have some
moral worth. But moral significance is a broader notion than moral
worth: moral depravity is morally significant. Since we are all fa-
miliar with deliberate evil, and with deliberate purposeful activities
that are morally neutral, deliberateness alone will not do: killing
after long deliberation is usually considered more, not less, repre-
hensible than spontaneous, undeliberate killing under provocation.
Finnis' thesis that law is necessarily a human good thus would re-
quire the (false) assertion that all deliberate human actions are val-
99. This is Raz's point. RAZ at 225-26; see also supra pp. 1254-55 (efficiency not morally valua-
ble in itself). Finnis refers to it in his own discussion. See supra note 79. He argues that the rule of
law does not function merely as a neutral way of achieving efficiency, that it also "systematically
restricts the government's freedom of manoeuvre." FINNIS at 274. But he concedes that "conspirators
against the common good" may seek to capitalize on the popularity of the ideal of the rule of law by
adhering to its requirements while pursuing their evil aims. Id. Thus, even according to him, a func-
tional description of law in terms of "obedience" to the ideal of the rule of law need not guarantee
law's overall moral worthiness. Moreover, Finnis is here considering the claim that all law must
promote the ideal of the rule of law (which Raz and other positivists see as of moral value), not the
inevitable moral evaluativeness of all functional accounts. I do not think Finnis has any reason to
insist that functional analyses are necessarily moral evaluations. See the Fuller-Nagel exchange, supra
note 17.
100. See supra p. 1254.
101. Finnis may hold to this thesis. See FINNIS at 3-4. Fuller clearly accepts it. See Fuller,
Human Purpose and Natural Law, supra note 17, at 70.
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uable as such.
Human actions should be evaluated by their goodness, not by
formal criteria that do not guarantee goodness. There may be some
types of human activities, such as teaching, helping the suffering, or
relieving pain, which are so defined that their deliberate perform-
ance is necessarily good. But the making, enforcement, and applica-
tion of law may be done either with deliberate conscientiousness or
with deliberate corruption. 102
It follows from this refutation of the possible arguments for the strong
thesis that there is nothing methodologically unsophisticated about ad-
vancing conceptions of law that are not morally evaluative. The claim
may still be made, however, that a non-evaluative conception of law, al-
though methodologically acceptable, involves a falsification of the nature
of law, and that such conceptions should thus be rejected for all purposes
and in all contexts. But even this final attempt to save the strong thesis
must fail, on the ground that conceptions are judged by their utility.
No one denies that strongly evaluative conceptions of Finnis' type may
be helpful and useful in some contexts. Finnis himself, however, mentions
the special importance of isolating law from the flow of practical reason-
ing so that it can bring specificity and predictability into human life."0 3 To
do that, we must be able to identify laws unambiguously. This was, we
should recall, one of Raz's arguments for the social thesis: the judge must
know whether a given standard is the law by which he is bound; the
citizen, whether a command is law when he considers whether to obey it;
parties to transactions, what the law governing their transaction is-and
these determinations should be final, excluding moral arguments." 4 In all
these situations, the functions of law require that the law be identified in
an all-or-nothing fashion that is not open to moral argument. But evalua-
tive conceptions of law of the type advanced by Finnis inevitably fail when
put to the task, for which they are not designed, of providing a yes-or-no
answer to the question of what the law on a certain question is. 05 It fol-
102. It is not even clear that public perception of the activities of lawyers and advocates is not
evaluative in the negative sense. It is clear that these functions and purposeful actions are regarded
with at least some ambivalence.
103. FINNIS at 266-70, 279; see also infra p. 1269. For Finnis' general account of the importance
of relative autonomy for human law, see supra TAN 56-59.
104. See supra p. 1253; see also CONCEPT, supra note 4, at 210-16 (identifying major function
served by social thesis as finality).
105. Finnis is well aware that his conception does not identify law so as to distinguish it from
non-law. FINNIS at 278-80; see also supra note 59. A definition of law that identifies it, he says, is a
technical device for use within legal systems. It is not applicable to the different pursuit of under-
standing law "from the outside," as one among many social forces. He is quite right, and Raz himself
uses an "external," non-identificatory characterization of law for these purposes, see supra note 86.
Finnis' point does not deal with the need for a conception of law usable in work within the legal
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lows that for these concededly important purposes we need a nonmoral
criterion for identifying law. There seems no reason for not constructing a
conception of law based only on this criterion. This conception, like the
criterion generating it, will be non-evaluative (in the strong or moral
sense) and will enable us to identify law and to distinguish it from non-
law. 106
Finnis himself seems to accept all these arguments. First, he invokes the
authority of Weber,107 a well-known champion of the view that social con-
cepts involve judgments only about importance, who vehemently denies
that construction of ideal types requires making moral judgments. ' Men-
tioning Weber without referring to his critics on this point suggests an
endorsement only of the weak thesis.t"' Moreover, Finnis himself accepts
that sometimes it may be useful to define law by a single element, so as to
highlight a particular relationship; such conceptions of law apparently
may be formed without making moral evaluations."' Finally, Finnis also
recognizes, as he must, that there are cases in which it is essential to iden-
tify law clearly. When a law of questionable moral merit is declared le-
gally binding by the highest court of the land, "[i]t is not conducive to
clear thought, or to any good practical purpose, to smudge the positivity of
system.
106. While it is clear that a conception of law designed for work within the legal system must be
non-evaluative, it is not clear that all conceptions of law from the point of view of the social theorist
must be evaluative in the strong sense. Weber's definition of law, for example, is both external to the
legal system and non-evaluative in that sense: "An order will be called law if it is externally guaran-
teed by the probability that coercion (physical or psychological), to bring about conformity or to
avenge violation, will be applied by a staff of people holding themselves specially ready for that pur-
pose." M. WEBER, LAW AND ECONOMY IN SOCIETY 5 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954) (emphasis in origi-
nal). Raz's external characterization of the unique features of law is similarly non-evaluative.
107. Weber's methodology (forming "ideal types"), says Finnis, is similar to his own suggestion
that conceptions should be seen to have focal meanings without relegating non-focal cases to another
discipline. FINNIS at 9, 18; see also id. at 21 n.I.4 (referring to Weber's position on need to make
judgments about significance in formation of concepts).
108. Weber took special care to explain that his types are "ideal" in the sense that they do not
describe anything that obtains, that they are theoretical constructs imposed on phenomena to make
them intelligible. He stressed that they are not ideal in the sense of being desirable: "An 'ideal type' in
our sense, to repeat once more, has no connection at all with value judgments, and it has nothing to do
with any type of perfection other than a purely logical one." Weber, supra note 94, at 98-99; see also
id. at 91-92, 96-98.
109. Finnis notes enigmatically that Weber did not think a real appreciation of the requirements
of practical reasonableness was necessary for the objective part of a theorist's work. FINNIS at 21 n.I.4.
He deals at length with Weber's position on the nonobjectivity of moral judgments, referring to
Strauss' discussion of Weber in STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953). FINNIS at 50-51
n.II.3. But Strauss discusses and criticizes Weber's methodology precisely on the point of the inability
to form non-evaluative concepts. Finnis' failure to cite him on this issue thus supports the conclusion
that he accepts Weber's own position on this question.
110. FINNIS at 277-78. Here too Finnis refers to the fact that empirical/historical importance can
only be measured, in the last analysis, by reference to the principles of practical reasonableness. Id. at
277 n.8. Nevertheless, he accepts the legitimacy of saying dramatically that, for example, a system
without sanctions "is not law" if the purpose is to emphasize, and to draw attention to the empirical/
historical importance of, that element of law. (He rejects relying on such a conception "to banish the
other non-central cases to some other discipline"). Id. at 278.
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the law by denying the legal obligatoriness in the legal or intra-systemic
sense of a rule recently affirmed as legally valid and obligatory by the
highest institution of the 'legal system.' ""' Thus, for Finnis too the law
may be identified for some purposes by purely social criteria, without re-
course to moral arguments.
All this suggests that the positions of Raz and Finnis as to conceptions
of law are indeed compatible. Both believe external conceptions of law
must be evaluative in the weak sense. Both believe that, for some pur-
poses, a non-evaluative internal criterion for identifying law from within
the system is necessary (Raz's social thesis). Their differences are impor-
tant, but do not rise to the level of contradiction.
'"2
B. The Limits of Jurisprudence
Some scholars say that jurisprudence deals only with legal reasoning,
with the analysis of basic concepts of the law, and with the nature of law.
Others add "normative jurisprudence," the articulation of what law and
laws should be and how legal entities should act.
Raz does not explicitly state his conception of the limits of jurispru-
dence, which must consequently be extracted from some scattered observa-
tions. He distinguishes between general practical philosophy and legal
philosophy by saying that the latter deals only with the consequences of
something being a law, describing his own essays on moral attitudes to
law as belonging to political philosophy rather than to jurisprudence,'1
Although his own characterization of law includes many elements that
cannot be applied in an all-or-nothing fashion," 4 he accepts and stresses
the need to distinguish dearly between law and non-law within a legal
system, seeing this as an identifying mark of legal systems."' Further-
more, he justifies the study of law as a separate subject, to be defined by
the professional view of the field, and the encouragement of public aware-
ness of the distinctness of law, with due attention to its relations with
other social forces and institutions.1' 6 In all these, Raz is squarely within
the positivistic tradition, which similarly seeks to emphasize the distinctive
marks of law and to study it as a special form of social control.
Finnis is much less interested in the intra-systemic perspective and in
professional needs. His perspective is that of the social theorist or of the
person who wishes to use the law to improve society. In neither of these
111. Id. at 357.
112. Raz explicitly mentions this lack of contradiction. CONCEPT, supra note 4, at 213 n.11.
113. See supra note 43.
114. See supra note 86.
115. RAZ at 39-40.
116. RAZ at 44; see also supra p. 1257.
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capacities does he have to distinguish sharply between laws and not-
laws."' He grants that the distinction between ethics, politics, and juris-
prudence may be pedagogically useful, but he warns that taking this sepa-
ration as more than convenient falsifies all three disciplines: all should be
studied together."' More particularly, Finnis objects to the tendency of
lawyers and legal scholars to end their inquiries with a determination of
the existing state of the law; he believes the moral obligation to obey the
law should be discussed as a part of jurisprudence, and be seen as an
integral part of lawyers' concerns." 9 Further, he objects to the similar
professional tendency to view the question whether a rule or a regime is
legal as requiring an all-or-nothing determination, claiming that social
phenomena should be described as "more legal" or "less legal" rather
than as "law" or "not law." ''
I believe Finnis is right to complain, in the natural law tradition, that
positivistic accounts have been perceived to imply a narrow vision of law
and its relation to morality. None of the great positivistic thinkers was
guilty of this myopic view;" ' but legal practitioners soon discovered the
convenience of saying that they were there to study the law and use it,
that what went beyond the law was beyond their competence and respon-
sibility. Positivists, who simply resisted the tendency to collapse law into
morality or religion, never encouraged such views. 22 Finnis probably feels
that the positivists' efforts have been successful, so that we are now free to
stress the close relationship, not the differences, between law and moral-
ity. Some, however, disagree with this view. 2 1 In any event, what we need
117. See supra note 105.
118. See supra note 75.
119. Finnis, in one of his rare uses of the label, calls "positivists" those who encourage the view
that the moral obligation to obey the law should not be discussed within jurisprudence. FINNIS at 357-
59.
120. Id. at 278-79. For a similar argument, see J. Griffith, The Division of Labor in Social
Control: A Reformulation of the Relationship Between Law and Social Control (1980) (unpublished
manuscript on file with Yale Law Journal).
121. Finnis' criticism singles Austin out. See FINNIS at 354-55, 357. When Austin is read in his
entirety, it is clear that he believes that jurists must undertake to discuss moral principles (for him,
utility): Although he defines jurisprudence to exclude the "science of legislation," three out of his six
lectures are devoted to a discussion of morality. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DE-
TERMINED 126-27 (1954). He advocates critical examination-even, at times, disobedience-of the
law, concluding, like Finnis, that the moral (utilitarian) obligation to obey the law is normally quite
weighty, but not absolute. Id. at 184-85.
122. Bentham and Austin, for example, stressed the positive character of law, J. AUSTIN, supra
note 121, at 184-91; J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (1823), in opposition to such
statements as Blackstone's famous definition of law, see 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF ENGLAND *44-46.
123. Thus, Charles Black has argued recently that there is a modem tendency to argue directly
from moral principles and to underestimate the need to expect courts to decide according to law, not
according to morality. See C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981). Similarly, Jenkins ar-
gues that we sin against the constraints of law and adjudication by expecting judges to apply moral
principles directly, without the mediation of legal rules and principles. Jenkins, The Rule of Law vs.
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is a balanced account both of relationships between law and morality and
of the differences between them. Both Finnis and Raz seem to give such
accounts, with different emphases; 24 this is not a bone of contention be-
tween them, or between their versions of natural law and positivism.
Finnis is clearly right that intra-systemic reasoning often involves dis-
cussion of moral considerations,2 5 that there are cases in which judges
have to consider what the law ought to be in order to decide what it will
be. Raz concedes this may happen.' 26 Nevertheless, it is important not to
blur the distinction between judicial and general practical reasoning.
Judges employ "legal logic": they usually justify their decisions by
processes of reasoning based on subsuming the instant case under a more
general norm, whether settled and preexisting (derived from a statute or a
line of precedents) or new and articulated for that case. These canons of
legal reasoning, coupled with constitutional principles about the proper
limits of judicial activity, exert a real and an important force on the "ad-
ministration of justice," making it quite distinct, at times, from the admin-
istration of justice proper. 27 This element, too, should not be obscured in
attempting to stress the relationships between law and morals. What is
needed is an integrated perspective that properly stresses both the auton-
omy of the law and law's ties to morality, with sufficient flexibility to
emphasize more the element that the "temper of the time" tends to ob-
scure, to insure that all the questions that should be dealt with are indeed
discussed. On this score Finnis has little to complain of: the question of
the nature and the scope of the obligation to obey the law is anything but
neglected in recent legal and political philosophy.
28
Emphasis on the autonomy of law is needed not only to achieve a bal-
The Call of Conscience, 23 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 169 (1978).
124. RAZ at 157-59. Finnis insists that it is a distortion of natural law theories to accuse them of
blurring the distinction between positive law and morality. FINNIS at 25-29.
125. FINNIS at 355-57; see also infra p. 1277.
126. See supra notes 12, 22; see also CONCEPT, supra note 4, at 215. Ronald Dworkin denies this
view, arguing that judges always seek to find the one right answer embedded in legal material. R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 14-45, 81-130 (1977). This position is unacceptable under
Raz's thesis that the law has limits and is identified by the sources thesis. See PRINCIPLES, supra note
4; RAZ at 53-77.
127. Rax's tenth essay, RAZ at 180-209, helps identify situations in which law-elements alone
decide cases. For a systematic discussion, see N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THE-
ORY (1978). For a sensitive discussion of a conflict between the requirements of judicial office and of
general moral reasoning that was resolved in favor of the former, see R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED
197-238 (1975); see also supra note 123.
128. Finnis himself observes that those who argue that the moral merits of law are not ajurispru-
dential issue persistently "smuggle" into their discussions comments about those merits. FINNIS at
358-59. What he is criticizing is unclear: those writers do not maintain that all books dealing with
jurisprudence should contain only jurisprudential statements. Raz's book, for example, explicitly seeks
to deal with both jurisprudence and political philosophy. For a survey of discussions in recent litera-
ture of the scope of the obligation to obey the law, see Symposium in Honor of A.D. Wooziey on Law
and Obedience, 67 VA. L. REV. 1 (1981).
1272
Vol. 91: 1250, 1982
Natural Law
anced account of law. It is important to take separable areas of study out
of the general realm of intellectual activity, to enable people to specialize
and thus to make more sophisticated contributions than would otherwise
be possible. Specialists-both scholars and practitioners-do need to re-
turn at times to the general, to see their fields in their larger contexts;
nonetheless, Finnis can make passing reference to many issues only be-
cause other people have been working on a variety of jurisprudential
questions.'29 Not all of them spend much, or any, time thinking about
principles of practical reasonableness; yet their work helps Finnis form his
own synoptic view of the field.
Clearly, a full understanding of society requires an understanding of
law, morality, and politics in their complex interrelations. But under-
standing of interrelations requires conceptual distinctions. The fear is not
unreal that such distinctions may lead to a tendency to overlook the inter-
relations when convenient. Unfortunately, it is real because the distinc-
tions are real; obscuring this fact cannot be very helpful or effective. 3 '
It is not really very important whether the discipline of jurisprudence is
seen as encompassing only attempts to understand and describe law, or as
including evaluation as well. What is important are two things. First, the
independent utility and general permissibility of the intra-systemic study
of law should be recognized. Second, the study of the interaction of law
with other social forces, and its subjection to moral criticism, should be
acknowledged to be indispensable.' 3'
Finnis' perspective and concerns make him highly sensitive to the dan-
gers of extending professional perspectives beyond their proper area of
applicability. Raz would probably concede that this sensitivity is one of
the benefits of the natural law perspective: for, although positivists may in
fact be similarly sensitive, nothing structured into their approach forces
such awareness in the way the natural law tradition does. Nevertheless,
129. Some examples are Dworkin's work on the role of principles in legal reasoning, see supra
note 126, at 14-45 (mentioned by Finnis, FINNIS at 280), and recent work on the need for authority
and norms to solve coordination problems (mentioned by Finnis, id. at 255 n.IX.1).
130. Finnis is correct in saying that it is a mistake, a falsification of the understanding of law,
politics, and ethics, to move from acceptance of the limits set by positivists to the discipline of jurispru-
dence to a belief that jurisprudence is completely independent of politics and morality. See supra pp.
1262, 1271. But trying to overlook the extent to which the law is in fact autonomous-the extent to
which we can and do make statements, without full moral endorsement, about the law-may be as
false to the nature of law, politics, and ethics as the first danger.
131. Nothing in positivism compels positivists not to address the question of moral attitudes to
law. Moreover, for many of them the adoption of a positivistic theory of law was motivated in part by
their belief that positivism contributed to a proper understanding of the dilemma of the moral obliga-
tion to obey the law. See infra p. 1274. Raz contributes to this practice both by holding the claim of
legitimate authority to be one of the characteristic features of law and by acknowledging that the law
is normative "from the legal point of view" (S.) only when many people are willing to endorse its
legitimate authority (S,), calling the intra-systemic obligation "parasitic" on the full-blooded moral
obligation. See supra pp. 1256-57.
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the two positions are clearly compatible. Raz acknowledges the need to
study law within the broader framework of its relationships with other
institutions, with positive morality, and with other social forces,' 2 and
himself transcends what he sees as the limits of jurisprudence in some of
his work. Finnis advocates the broader vision, but concedes the practical
importance of the intra-systemic insulation.'
III. Political Obligation and Legal Theory
Whether the positivistic or the natural law perspective is superior has
been argued on two separate grounds, at least since the Hart-Fuller de-
bate in 1958.11" One ground is cognitive and descriptive: that one perspec-
tive more accurately (and the other more falsely) describes the phenome-
non of law. The second is practical and evaluative: that one perspective is
more conducive to the development and maintenance of proper moral atti-
tudes to law than the other.
The light shed on the discussion of the practical ground is one of the
greatest benefits of seeing that the descriptions offered by the two perspec-
tives are not necessarily inconsistent. If one of two competing theories is
true and the other false, to consider pragmatic reasons for adopting the
false theory may signify lack of intellectual integrity. Only because the
accounts of Raz and Finnis are not incompatible is it legitimate to investi-
gate whether one of them is superior for some (practical) purposes and to
advocate exclusive use in such contexts of the superior theory.
Yet analysis of Raz and Finnis on political obligation suggests that,
although they operate within somewhat different frameworks of discussion
and their positions differ in at least one important respect, it is impossible
to predict how adopting either's theory will affect actual conduct. More-
over, their differences are not entailed (although they are affected) by
Raz's positivistic and Finnis' natural law orientation. Thus, no valid ar-
gument results for preferring one perspective on practical grounds. Once
the two approaches are integrated in the way suggested above, each indi-
vidual may work with the procedure he prefers: the substance of the treat-
ment of the question of political obligation will not change.
A. Raz and Finnis on Moral Attitudes to Law
Raz argues that there is no general obligation, either moral or pruden-
132. See supra note 42 & p. 1270.
133. E.g., FINNIS at 279.
134. HART, supra note 7; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart,
supra note 21.
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tial, to obey the law."' s Even when the law is good and just, there are no
"grounds which make it desirable, other things being equal, that one
should always do as the law requires."' 36 Arguments from bad effects,
encouragement to disobey the law, promises to obey, and estoppel may
indeed support special moral obligations to obey the law, but they fail to
provide general grounds for such an obligation. The law often does pro-
vide prudential reasons for obeying it, primarily the wish to avoid legal
sanctions. These reasons are not sufficiently extensive, however, to support
a general obligation to obey the law.
In the absence of such a general obligation, the law performs its func-
tion of guiding behavior by relying on two main techniques. First, most
laws do provide prudential reasons for obedience. Second, the law aids in
"the marking in a publicly ascertainable way, of standards required by
the organized society.""' This marking does not in itself.create reasons for
action; it invokes and relies on independent moral reasons to obey those
standards. The prevalence of prudential and independent moral reasons
for doing what specific laws require makes the law an important and ef-
fective social institution even without any general obligation to obey it.
Thus, both techniques can be used effectively to protect morally valuable
interests and worthwhile forms of social cooperation.
Because no such general obligation exists, good citizens are not in gen-
eral required to obey their law, even when the legal system is, by and
large, good and just. Raz argues that in such circumstances the citizen
may adopt a moral position of respect for law, as an expression of loyalty
to his community (although his allegiance may be expressed in other
ways).' A general obligation to obey the law is created by that choice, as
an obligation is created by a promise or in the context of relationships
such as friendship.
The absence of a general obligation to obey does not, for Raz, imply a
right to civil disobedience."' Acts of civil disobedience, which attempt to
attract attention to some political grievance, do have undesirable conse-
quences that create a moral reason to obey. Adopting the principle that
individuals need to claim a right to do a thing only when they cannot
claim that they were doing "the right thing,"' Raz argues that, in re-
135. RAZ at 233. See also Raz, Authority and Consent, 67 VA. L. REV. 103 (1981).
136. RAZ at 234.
137. Id. at 246.
138. Id. at 250-61.
139. Id. at 262-75.
140. Raz argues that individuals can use two types of arguments to convince others that they are
entitled to perform an action: that the action is right; and that they have a right to perform it. The
latter type shows entitlement to perform even when the action is wrong. RAZ at 273-74.
The language of rights has become very central to legal and political philosophy. Some have seen
this as an indication that positivism is on the decline, since the affirmation of rights has always been
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gimes where the right to political participation is reasonably well pro-
tected, people are entitled to disobey only in circumstances that make it
morally right; the justification of the act must rest on its own merits.
The case for a right to conscientious objection-a general immunity
from being required by law to violate one's strong convictions-seems
more persuasive. 1" Such a prima facie right may exist; that right nonethe-
less may be defeated by the need to protect values besides autonomy and
respect for moral convictions as such. Raz, without stating a firm conclu-
sion, simply outlines a few of the relevant considerations on this
question.
142
For Raz, the question of moral attitudes to law belongs to political phi-
losophy rather than jurisprudence, and is to be addressed after identifying
the law according to the social thesis; that question is whether a moral
(S,) duty exists to perform legal (S.) duties. He does not examine why
people in fact do obey the law in most cases. And he stresses that the
social thesis is consistent with the claim that all legal obligations are
moral obligations as well.
Finnis' conception of law is formed, as we have seen, from the point of
view of those for whom the law (at least presumptively) should be
obeyed."' He accepts the moral theorem that all must be lawabiding for
the sake of the common good.' 44 But this obligation to be lawabiding pre-
supposes that the rulers exercise their authority to promote the common
good, as they should. If they do not, and if the actual laws they enact are
unjust, the presumption that obedience is required may be rebutted."
t4
Finnis analyzes in four steps, based on four different senses of the ex-
part of natural law traditions. Thus, Ronald Dworkin argues that a neglect of rights is one of the
inadequacies of legal positivism. R. DWORKIN, supra note 126. Nozick is another champion of rights
who invokes natural-law arguments. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). See also
Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 826 (1979). This question clearly is beyond
the limits of this review; but it should be noted that rights-talk (like duty-talk) is not inconsistent with
legal positivism, as evidenced by Raz's own discussion. For both kinds of talk, the semantic thesis is of
only limited application (although dealing with rights-talk is in fact simpler for Finnis, see FINNIS at
198-230).
141. The relevant difference between civil disobedience and conscientious objection is that the first
is a public act designed to change public policies and, thus, necessarily to attract attention to the fact
of disobedience. Conscientious objection, on the other hand, is a private attempt by an individual to
avoid public coercion. RAZ at 276-89.
142. Raz argues for a prima facie right not to have one's conscience coerced by the law, a right
entailed by an interpretation of humanistic ethics that highly regards moral autonomy and pluralism.
He advances three considerations against the introduction of a general right to conscientious objection:
the possibility of easy abuse, since the objector's word is the only direct evidence of the moral attitudes
concerned; the encouragement of self-doubt and of morbid introspection into the complexities of one's
motives for action; and the likelihood of invasion of privacy unless mere declaration by the objector is
sufficient. Id. at 287-89.
143. See supra p. 1266.
144. See supra pp. 1260-61.
145. FINNIS at 318-19.
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pression "an obligation to obey the law," the question of what effect the
injustice of a law may have on the obligation to obey it.'
1. The expression may mean that I may be punished if I do not com-
ply. (This is what Raz calls the prudential obligation.) The practi-
cal question then asked is that of Holmes' "bad man": am I likely
to be punished? 47 Finnis complains that this is the one sense of the
question that is least interesting to individuals concerned with do-
ing the right thing. 141 Clearly, the injustice of the law does not af-
fect this prudential obligation.
2. It may mean that, within the legal system, the law is considered to
be binding and obligatory (S,). The practical question then is
whether, despite claims that some action is unjust, the law indeed
requires that it be performed. Finnis argues that, the intentional
and justified isolation of legal norms from the general flow of prac-
tical reasoning notwithstanding, this question is not redundant,
since legal systems often consider the requirements of justice in de-
termining the legal validity of a law. 49 Once the high court of a
jurisdiction decides that a law is intra-systemically valid and bind-
ing, this sense of the question is settled, and an obligation to obey
the law is identified.1
50
3. A third meaning of the expression refers to the moral obligation to
obey all laws (what Raz calls the "general moral obligation to
obey"). The corresponding practical question is whether this pre-
sumptive obligation holds for an unjust law. Finnis says no: since
the presumptive authority of law is based on the importance of au-
146. Id. at 354-62.
147. Holmes' "bad man" is the person who is concerned only with prudential reasons for obeying
the law, which he defines as Holmes does: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, is what I mean by the law." O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
173 (1921). Holmes did not mean to imply that most people are "bad" in this sense; he wanted only
to identify an important set of reasons for obedience and the corresponding conception of law. Much
American legal thought has been elaboration, critique, and defense of his views. The first "round"
was in the 1930's, when both the realists and their critics claimed to be disciples of Holmes. See
Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 352 (1931); Yntema, The Ra-
tional Basis of Legal Science, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 925 (1981). Fuller criticized Holmes for being the
father of positivism, starting another exchange on the subject. See Howe, The Positivism of Mr.
Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1951); Hart, Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 HARV.
L. REV. 929 (1951); Howe, Rejoinder, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939 (1951). Finnis similarly discusses
Holmes' related claim that contractual obligations are obligations to pay damages, not to perform the
contract. FINNIS at 320-25.
148. FINNIS at 354-55.
149. Id. at 355-57. Openness to claims that a law's injustice is some evidence of its invalidity is
particularly apparent in systems with American-style Bills of Rights coupled with a power of judicial
review. Id. at 356. For a discussion of this unique feature of the American system and its effect on the
types of claims that may be made in courts, see Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English
Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 969-71 (1977).
150. FINNIS at 357. See also supra p. 1270.
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thority to the common good, an unjust exercise of authority cannot
benefit from this moral force. In this sense, "unjust laws are not
laws.""'t
4. Finally, "obligation to obey" may mean an obligation all-things-
considered, which is not derived from the mere fact that a duty was
prescribed by recognized authority. Although an unjust law is not
binding in itself, there may be other moral reasons-such as the
danger that disobedience will be seen as a license to disobey just
laws and will bring the law in its entirety into contempt-to con-
form to the unjust law.
5 2
Both Raz and Finnis are aware that their treatments of this problem
cannot provide any specific guidance for the individual who has to decide
whether to obey the law in a particular instance.'53 Raz comments broadly
that no general considerations can ever dictate answers to specific practical
problems."4
B. Proper Moral Attitudes to Law
Raz and Finnis clearly share the view that it is important to try to
articulate proper moral attitudes to law. The most important difference
between their views concerns Finnis' affirmation of a presumptive general
moral obligation to obey the law; Raz questions the applicability of such a
presumptive obligation to a legal context,"' and argues that the mere exis-
tence of law does not create a general moral reason for obedience. Even
this difference, however, may be more limited than it first appears, since
Raz himself believes that many people are likely to adopt an attitude of
respect for law: their moral attitude to law is that of Finnis' reasonable
man. Moreover, although there is no general moral reason for obedience,
there are a number of valid moral reasons, some of which are very exten-
sive, for obeying particular laws. Finally, Finnis' presumptive obligation
does not apply to unjust laws: once a law is judged unjust, Finnis' and
Raz's positions are indistinguishable. And, since even Raz agrees that
there are independent moral reasons to do what a just law requires, the
two approaches lead in practice to the same' results.
151. FINNIS at 360-61, 363-66. "Unjust laws are not laws" is not contradictory because "law" is
used in two senses. The first is the intra-systemic (S.) sense: a norm is legally valid if it "(i) . . .
emanate[s] from a legally authorized source, (ii) will in fact be enforced by courts and/or officials,
and/or (iii) is commonly spoken of as a law like other laws." Id. at 360-61. The second is the (S,)
conception of the reasonable man with his "unrestricted perspective." Id. at 361.
152. Id. at 361-62.
153. Id. at 362; RAZ at 261.
154. RAZ at v-vi.
155. Id. at 234-35. At the same time, he observes that most people believe they have an obligation
to obey the law, and that they regard this obligation as much more stringent than a prima facie
reason. Id.
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Thus, the pressing practical question is not that of the presumptive ob-
ligation, but that of the obligation to obey all-things-considered. On this
question there seems to be an impressive, if vague, consensus between
most scholars in the field, Raz and Finnis included. This consensus holds
that, under the legal systems we are familiar with, in most cases and for
most individuals there is a moral obligation to obey the law, either be-
cause it is the law or because there are independent moral reasons to do
what the law requires. When legal authority is abused, however, at times
it may be permissible not to obey. In extreme cases, that permission may
even become a moral obligation to resist and to disobey.
There is no indication that the difference between Raz and Finnis on
the presumptive obligation to obey would dictate any different stand on
the moral merits of obedience or disobedience in particular cases. More-
over, Raz's rejection of this general moral duty to obey does not follow
from his version of positivism: he himself states that the social thesis is
compatible with the claim that every legal system's claim to authority is
justified;'56 and many positivists have incorporated a general moral obliga-
tion to obey the law into their theories of law."' Nonetheless, this differ-
ence is real and important. It relates to the question that both Finnis and
Raz consider central: to what extent, and under what circumstances, is it
justified to "accept authority" and to suspend one's own judgment about
the moral merits of a case?
Both scholars accept that some acceptance of authority may be justified
and consistent with autonomy. But Raz recommends relying on one's own
judgment about the moral merits of each case. The adoption of a general
attitude of respect for law is sometimes permissible, but never required.
Finnis, on the other hand, considers more important the need for effective
authority for attempts at coordination and promotion of the common good.
He emphasizes that the existence of law is good for the community, thus
justifying a general presumptive obligation to obey.
Both Raz and Finnis advocate moral criticism of positive law. The dif-
ference between endorsing and rejecting a general presumptive moral obli-
gation to obey the law affects moral deliberations only in cases where no
circumstances clearly alert one to the possibility of injustice. In such cases,
Finnis' reasonable man (and Raz's respectful citizen) may tend to obey
without independent moral evaluation. Moral citizens who reject the gen-
eral obligation, thus retaining their freedom to act on the moral merits of
the case, may after consideration reach the conclusion that they ought to
obey. But they may also realize that a moral reason for not obeying exists,
156. Id. at 39.
157. See, e.g., Hart, Are There any Natural Rights? 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955).
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leading them to conclude that this particular law does not deserve
obedience."'
The positivistic and natural law perspectives do not differ as to the
complementary facet of the proper moral attitude to law: the duty to re-
sist. Both agree that sometimes positive law is so hideous that there is a
moral obligation not to obey it. The general analyses provided by both
Raz and Finnis fail to identify the turning point. 59
C. Effects of Legal Theory on Moral Attitudes and Obedience
Rationally, a theory about law would be relevant to the attitudes people
adopt and to the way people act only if and to the extent that, first, people
in fact tend to act on moral considerations and reasons and, second, the
theory comments on the proper moral attitude to law and on the scope of
the duty to obey.
Whether an individual's choice of attitude or his actions in general are
effectively motivated by moral reasons are empirical questions. It seems
plausible that some people may be completely unresponsive to moral argu-
ments, that others may invariably act on their moral judgments, and that
for most people moral reasons for doing something count but may not
actually decide the issue. In other words, it seems safe to say that aware-
ness of the existence of a moral reason for obeying (or disobeying) the law
is likely to affect behavior. The likelihood that such reasons will be
searched out may depend, to some extent, on the moral attitude to law one
adopts-an action that also may be affected by moral reasons. The way
decisions are affected by this awareness may vary: people may do what
they think they should do, explaining their behavior in moral terms; or
they may do something else, and acknowledge the disregarded moral rea-
sons by offering an excuse or a justification. Other things equal, knowing
what one's duty is can only strengthen the tendency to do the morally
right thing.
Since a theory's relevance to behavior depends on its saying something
about the propriety of alternative courses of action, it seems to follow that
a descriptive theory of law, which does not purport to say anything at all
about that question, is not relevant to conduct. As such, it can neither be
praised as encouraging moral conduct nor condemned for its failure to do
so. The question does not even exist for Finnis and for natural law theory,
158. When a law's injustice is clear, Finnis' citizen will nevertheless "retrieve" the moral obliga-
tion from the general flow of practical reason and consider the merits of the case. See supra p. 1261.
The presumptive moral obligation to obey will make no difference.
159. See supra notes 153-54. Some maintain that general philosophical positions do decide cases.
E.g., B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1977) ("Philosophy decides
cases; and hard philosophy at that.") I take this to be metaphorical language.
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denying as they do the possibility of such a division. For them, a pre-
sumptive moral obligation to obey is a part of the (descriptive) conception
of law. But even positivistic descriptive theories of law have some practical
implications: what they say about the nature of law includes data relevant
to the moral decision of whether to obey. The question of relevance does
not exist, naturally, for Raz's statements about proper moral attitudes to
law.
Is either theory about the proper moral attitudes to law always or gen-
erally more conducive to morally right conduct? We saw that Finnis and
Raz differ only as to the presumptive moral obligation to obey, and that
this difference cannot be ascribed to their belonging to different schools of
thought. Nonetheless, positivists and natural lawyers have always debated
which theory is superior in application.
Thus, natural lawyers accuse positivists of obscuring the moral obliga-
tion to obey the law, which exists in most situations, by emphasizing pru-
dential reasons for obedience and by analyzing legal obligation as if the
question were exhausted by those prudential reasons (only the first step in
Finnis' analysis of the obligation to obey the law)."0 Yet positivists are
also said to encourage blind obedience to all mandates of de facto authori-
ties, since they identify law by its emanation from such purely social
sources.' Positivists, on the other hand, accuse natural lawyers of obscur-
ing the nature of the dilemma of disobedience. On their account, natural
lawyers give the impression that one is always morally obliged to obey the
law; they introduce the possibility of disobedience only by playing with
the meaning of "law," denying that honorable name to some exceptionally
evil edicts. This, the positivists say, confuses the issue, and may generate
two dangers: that of extreme conservatism, by lulling people into the belief
that all positive law is necessarily justified and thus worthy of obedience;
or that of easy revolution, by stripping positive law of all validity by
claiming that it conflicts with "natural law."''
The symmetry alone of these accusations should evoke suspicion of their
validity.' We have seen that Raz attends to the moral dimensions of legal
obligation, and that Finnis deals with the pragmatic need for sanctions
and with providing prudential reasons for obedience. Both Raz and Finnis
argue against the reduction of all conforming behavior, or all legal tech-
niques, to the fear of sanctions. If Raz and Finnis may be taken as repre-
160. Finnis criticizes in these terms Hume's analysis of promissory obligation, FINNIS at 301-03,
and Hart's of legal obligation, id. at 313-14. This is also part of his critique of Austin's discussion of
the obligation to obey the law. See supra note 121.
161. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, supra note 17, at
657-61.
162. Hart, supra note 7, at 597-98 (describing Bentham's view).
163. For an illuminating account of this symmetry, see Jenkins, supra note 3.
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sentative of their respective schools, it is clear that neither positivists nor
natural lawyers advocate blind obedience to positive law.
Although neither gives detailed guidelines for action, the general
frameworks of Raz and Finnis are designed to stress what each sees as
important-a point of real difference between them. For Finnis, it is of
great importance to emphasize the morality of obeying just laws, that all
moral persons should participate in their society's attempt to promote the
common good by coordination and cooperation. He challenges the view
implied in Holmes' "bad man" theory of law, 64 and in Hart's65 and
Raz's'" characterization of the legal point of view as not requiring that
people obey the law because of moral considerations. For Raz, on the
other hand, it is important to stress that, even though authority may be
consistent with autonomy, claims of authority should be carefully evalu-
ated, especially when made by powerful systems. Further, pointing out
that not all who obey the law do so for moral reasons, he holds that an
adequate explanation of general obedience cannot rest solely on moral
considerations. 167
I do not think we can know whether insisting on the presumptive mo-
rality of law or stressing the social nature of law is the better way to
increase moral sensitivity to and criticism of law. Both accounts concede
that effective authorities may be abused, that particular laws may be un-
just, that there are moral aspects to attitudes to law and to obedience to it.
In clear cases, we do not need a theory to identify the right thing to do;
when a situation is complex, only more detailed analyses than these can
help us. 6
Neither does history show that one approach better indicates when to
disobey. Natural law rhetoric has been used to support, justify, and de-
mand obedience to laws that today are considered blatantly unjust. 6 9 In-
164. See supra note 147.
165. H.L.A. HART, supra note 16, at 198. Hart offers his own dimension of the "internal point of
view" as an improvement over Holmes' account, which Hart criticizes as a form of "rule skepticism."
Id. at 55-57, 132-50. Finnis reasons that individuals who obey the law only for prudential reasons
have no concern for the law as providing an answer to social problems. Thus, such people will not try
to bring law into being, or to maintain it rather than another effective system of social control. FINNIS
at 12-15.
166. Id. at 11-18; see also id. at 322-25 (discussing Holmes).
167. RAZ at 245-49. Finnis concedes, of course, that many people do obey for prudential reasons.
FINNIS at 301-03.
168. See supra notes 153-54.
169. One vehicle for such claims was the "right to property," used to oppose any redistribution of
goods "justly" acquired. The United States Supreme Court relied on such rhetoric to invalidate some
progressivist legislation, see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and recently Robert
Nozick has made similar claims, see R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). This is not a
necessary feature of natural law theories, however. Finnis, for example, does not stipulate a natural
right to property; he concedes that some private property is necessary for the common good, but
argues that the details of the regimes should be considered under the general good of justice. FINNIS at
169-88.
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yoking their oath to obey the law while resisting arguments that morally
unjust laws were legally invalid, judges have justified enforcement of laws
they themselves despised.70 Fuller accuses positivism of contributing to
the moral insensitivity that enabled the Nazis to come to power in Ger-
many;'? yet Italian officials and private individuals said that Kelsen's pos-
itivism helped them to maintain the autonomy of the law and to resist
immoral political pressures."
The unsurprising lesson is that frames of thought, although indispensa-
ble, do not dictate answers to practical questions. Particular practical con-
clusions cannot be deduced from or predicted by general approaches, and
thus cannot successfully be used to evaluate them.
I take it that all agree that it is desirable that people will have the right
moral attitudes to law. I believe the only way of promoting this goal is
both to stress in all possible ways the moral requirement of sensitive criti-
cal appraisal of the law (including the usually conclusive moral reasons
for obeying) and not to tie that requirement too closely to any particular
conception of law. The diffuse, common-sense positivist conception of law
suffices for this purpose.
And, primarily because of pragmatic considerations to which neither
Raz nor Finnis appears to refer, I believe Raz has the better of their
dispute. The balance of convenience usually tends to favor obeying au-
thority.'7 Thus, there is a danger that, if accepting legal authority as
binding is considered permissible or obligatory, people will tend to avoid
critically examining the merits of particular cases and acting on their own
judgment. Raz's position has the advantage that it requires some aware-
ness of the moral merits of the case in all situations. 7 4 In most cases, there
170. For a discussion in these terms of the refusal of abolitionist Northern judges to invalidate
Fugitive Slave Acts, see R. COVER, supra note 127. Cover claims that if these judges had been less
"positivistic," they would have found a way to invalidate the objectionable laws. Id. at 159-74. I
cannot deal with this claim here; but its problematic nature should be stressed.
171. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, supra note 21, is not
alone. Some feel that the coup de grace was dealt to American Legal Realism because of the widely
shared view that its positivism did not contain the necessary guarantee against such catastrophes,
whereas the natural law perspective (with its structural guarantee that moral issues will always be
thought about) did. See Purcell, American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism and the
Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 424-46 (1969). For more accusations and some
critical discussion, see S. SHUMAN, supra note 7, at 177-99.
172. See Falk & Shuman, The Bellagio Conference on Legal Positivism, 14 J. LEGAL EDUC. 213-
28 (1961). This account suggests that moral awareness is a prerequisite to moral behavior, and that
positivistic legal theories do not prevent or even discourage such awareness.
173. That this tendency may go quite far was suggested in a very disturbing way by the famous
Milgram experiments, in which people were willing to inflict what they thought was great pain on
people they thought to be failing students, despite the pleas of the "students" for mercy, merely be-
cause the experimenter insisted that they had to go on. There was no sanction for "disobedience," not
even the withdrawal of any financial benefit for participating, and the experimenters were not in an
institutionalized position of authority. S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1975).
174. This is true at least for those who have not decided to adopt an attitude of respect for law as
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will be many moral reasons for obeying, and no serious moral doubts; a
moral obligation to obey will thus exist. 7 ' But even this obedience is de-
liberately affirmed by the individual, not merely accepted on authority.
The need to make such an affirmation, and the awareness that it must be
critically made, may help to counteract tendencies to obey when there are
no such good moral reasons for obedience.
The danger Finnis identifies is, I think, quite real and serious. When
the law is just, it is better that people should obey for moral reasons, not
merely for fear of legal sanctions. But Finnis cannot persuade a bad man
(if he exists) to fulfill his moral obligation to obey the law; yet a good and
weak man could be persuaded that, because such an obligation exists in
most cases, one should resolve doubtful cases in favor of obedience. In
combination with an authority's editing of the facts, with its dismissals of
complaints and protests, this attitude may encourage the blind obedience
that natural lawyers have accused positivists of cultivating.176
It is frustrating and somewhat disappointing that no clearer guidelines
result from analyzing right moral attitudes to law. Such nonresolutions
are not unique to the question of the obligation to obey the law: they
pervade the debate between positivist and natural lawyers. This grayness
stems in part from the refusal of most scholars to adopt an absolute posi-
tion on the obligation to obey the law. That this loss of clarity is justifed
can be seen by studying those endorsing an absolutist position.
While no one argues that there is never a moral obligation to obey law,
some have advanced the view that there exists an absolute moral obliga-
tion to obey all laws, under all circumstances."' Whether this position is
held by so-called positivists or by so-called natural lawyers, it deserves
nothing but criticism."'8 One of the chief virtues of these two books is that,
a manifestation of their allegiance.
175. This obligation exists because of considerations of fairness, estoppel, or the need both to
contribute to the welfare of the society from which individuals benefit and to participate in the scheme
for achieving coordination it accepts. Finnis stresses the last reason, but probably would accept the
moral force of the others as well. Raz concedes that all these reasons may support moral reasons for
obeying the law, which are at times very extensive, but argues that they are not broad enough to
support, for all individuals and in all instances of application, a general obligation to obey all laws.
See supra TAN 134-35.
176. Fuller held positivism responsible for some of the complacency that helped the Nazis come to
power. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, supra note 21, at
658-59. In post-war Germany many people invoked the defense of justification, coupled with igno-
rance of the facts that would make this defense inapplicable. This is the danger that I am afraid
Finnis' account may reinforce. For a detailed account of some of the problems of post-war German
legal institutions, see Pappe, On the Validity of Judicial Decisions in the Nazi Era, 26 MOD. L. REV.
260 (1960).
177. For a general account, see Wasserstrom, The Obligation to Obey the Law, in ESSAYS IN THE
PILOSOPHY OF LAW (R. Sumner ed. 1968). For an argument for an absolute duty of obedience, see
A. FORTAs, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968). Some such arguments are re-
futed in H. ZINN, DEMOCRACY AND DISOBEDIENCE (1968).
178. For the positivist, who identifies law by its pedigree, such a position would amount to blind
1284
Vol. 91: 1250, 1982
Natural Law
rather than opt for clearer (but wrong) positions on either extreme of the
range of possible answers, they acknowledge the complexity and the agony
that may be involved in choice.
Conclusion
As a way of making better use of their insights, I have chosen to stress
the agreement between Raz and Finnis, to emphasize the breadth of the
subjects they cover and the many contributions they make (rather than the
possible weaknesses of and problems with their accounts). Too much in
the history of legal thought has been lost by granting primacy to debates
and polemics. As Finnis says, the data about law and its functions are
something with which we are all intimately familiar.179 Like the six blind
men, we try again and again to describe ari elephant, forever finding that
we fail by emphasizing just one aspect, by illuminating one element while
obscuring others.
Maybe we can never do better than that. But. the two books under re-
view illustrate what can be gained by working from the different perspec-
tives of natural law and positivism. They show that, by refraining from
battling caricatures, each side may benefit from the insights of the other.
obedience to the law. A natural lawyer, who insists that there is always some moral obligation to
obey, only escapes this undesirable outcome by defining "law" in a way other than by pedigree, so
that extremely evil edicts, although emanating from authority, will not be considered "laws." This
tool clearly is not subtle enough to deal with injustice in laws, and it distorts and obscures the nature
of the dilemma of disobedience.
179. FINNIs at 9.
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